ABSTRACT-Both discrimination by private employers and governmental restrictions in the form of statutes that prohibit professional licensing serve to exclude the formerly incarcerated from much of the labor market. This Essay explores and analyzes potential legislative and contractual means for removing these barriers to labor market participation by the formerly incarcerated. First, as a means of addressing discrimination by the state, Part I of this Essay explores the ways in which the adoption of racial impact statements-which mandate that legislators consider statistical analyses of the potential impact their proposed legislation may have on racial and ethnic groups prior to enacting such legislation-could help to reduce labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. In so doing, this Part analyzes the influence of racial impact statements in the few states that have implemented them. Part II of this Essay examines the possibility of a contractual solution that could help to decrease discrimination against the formerly incarcerated in the private labor market, particularly by those employers who rely on the labor of imprisoned individuals. Specifically, this Part uses the fact that many private corporations rely on and profit from lowwage prison labor to argue that the state penal institutions that lease prisoners to such corporations should push for contractual agreements that stipulate that corporations relying on prison labor must revoke policies that bar employing the formerly incarcerated upon their release. In addition, this Part explicates how contractual stipulations may also provide for affirmative hiring policies for the formerly incarcerated. Finally, this Essay concludes by highlighting how failure to address continued labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated could render the formerly incarcerated a permanent economic underclass, thereby undermining notions of fairness and equality.
INTRODUCTION
Consider Shon Hopwood, a white man who robbed a bank at gunpoint in August of 1997, escaped with $50,000, and managed to perform four more robberies before the authorities eventually caught and arrested him.
1 Following Hopwood's capture, authorities brought him to justice for his robberies, and he ultimately served eleven years in federal prison.
2 While in prison, Hopwood worked at the prison law library and wrote briefs to appeal his case and the cases of other inmates; in fact, the third brief that Hopwood ever wrote was accepted as part of a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, a 1 
See Susan Svrluga, He Robbed Banks and Went to Prison. His Time There Put Him on Track for a New
Job: Georgetown Law Professor., WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/04/21/bank-robber-turned-georgetownlaw-professor-is-just-getting-started-on-his-goals [https://perma.cc/ACJ6-VFBG]. 2 Id.
1387 truly remarkable feat of lawyering. 3 At the age of thirty-three, Hopwood walked out of prison a free man. Although Hopwood's first post-prison job was at a car wash, he was soon able to switch jobs and begin working at a family-run legal printing business. 4 Shortly thereafter, the New York Times ran a profile on Hopwood, and Hopwood not only began to field speaking invitations, but also negotiated a book deal. 5 When Hopwood decided to pursue a career as an attorney, he initially encountered some difficulty in earning admission to law school, but with time, he received both admission and a full scholarship from the University of Washington School of Law. 6 After graduating from law school, Hopwood obtained a prestigious federal clerkship as his first post-graduation job. 7 Later, he received an employment offer at a law firm with a salary of $400,000 a year, followed by employment in a coveted tenure-track faculty position at Georgetown University Law Center. 8 Now compare Hopwood's remarkable story 9 and employment outcomes with those of Reginald "Dwayne" Betts, a black man who was convicted in 1996 for a carjacking he performed at the age of sixteen. 10 Following his conviction, Betts, who was once facing a possible life sentence, served eight years and three months in prison.
11 After Betts was released from prison, he earned a bachelor of arts degree from the University of Maryland, a masters of fine arts (MFA) in writing from Warren Wilson College, a Radcliffe Fellowship at Harvard University, and a law degree from Yale Law School. 12 Betts, a husband and father of two children, also published two critically acclaimed books of poetry and a memoir entitled A . 4 See Svrluga, supra note 1. 5 6 See Svrluga, supra note 1. 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 The focus on Professor Hopwood's story is not to begrudge him his success; rather, it is to highlight that formerly incarcerated people are capable of great success when they are truly given the opportunity to reach their full potential. We find his story to be incredibly inspiring. He is due the highest praise, and we believe his story is great evidence of why labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is so deeply problematic. 10 Question of Freedom. 13 Yet in February of 2017, after Betts had passed the Connecticut State Bar examination and accepted a position as a public defender in New Haven, the Bar Examining Committee for Connecticut denied him admission to the Connecticut Bar.
14 In its letter, the Bar Examining Committee explained its decision by stating that a "record manifesting a significant deficiency in the honesty, trustworthiness, diligence or reliability of an applicant may constitute a basis for denial of admission." 15 In the end, Betts was able to receive certification of good moral character from the Committee and earn admission to the Connecticut Bar, but only after nationwide protest and numerous newspaper articles critiquing the Committee's initial decision to deny Betts admission. 16 Professor James Forman of Yale Law School noted that it was sad that Betts, more than twenty years after he committed a carjacking as a teenager and after two decades of compiling an incredibly impressive academic and professional record, was still being told: "We are always going to judge you differently." 17 In fact, Betts's story reveals not only how he, a former felon, may forever be treated differently because of this status, but also how black former prisoners frequently receive different treatment than white former prisoners upon their release, even when they share similar credentials.
18 Unlike Hopwood, who was given numerous prestigious opportunities after law school, Betts instead was initially cut off at the pass when the Connecticut Bar first denied him admission into the profession. Although the outcome for Betts ultimately turned out to be positive, the difficulties he faced in simply gaining admission to the Bar illustrate how the collateral consequences of criminal convictions may be enacted in racially disparate ways.
As the Betts example shows, the formerly incarcerated, particularly those of color, are quite vulnerable to rampant labor market discrimination 13 
Id.
14 See Bari Weiss, Admit This Ex-Con to the Connecticut Bar, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/opinion/admit-this-ex-con-to-the-connecticut-bar.html [https://perma.cc/2GSN-MVK7]. 15 Id. 16 See Vinny Vella, State Bar Committee Approves Jail-to-Yale Lawyer, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-news-dwayne-betts-approved-20170929-story.html [https://perma.cc/4T3E-VB8D] (noting that Betts's case "drew national attention, including an editorial from The New York Times calling on the bar association to approve him"). Betts is now a student in the Ph.D. program at Yale Law School. YALE LAW SCH., Studying Law at Yale: Dwayne Betts, https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/degree-programs/graduate-programs/phd-program/phdcandidate-profiles/dwayne-betts [https://perma.cc/R7AF-3VMB]. 17 Weiss, supra note 14. 18 See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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after their release from prison. 19 Indeed, a 2015 survey of formerly incarcerated individuals revealed that 76% of the respondents rated their experience in finding employment as very difficult or nearly impossible due to their past criminal convictions.
20
This discrimination that the formerly incarcerated face in the labor market is extensive, occurring both as a result of governmental and private action. For instance, in many states and municipalities, the formerly incarcerated encounter significant difficulty in obtaining employment in licensed professions because government statutes either directly or indirectly prevent them from obtaining work licenses in a variety of fields, such as nursing, barbering, and education. 21 The formerly incarcerated also face 19 profession' open to an ex-felon is that of burglar; the ex-felon is barred from other activities because she or he is presumed to be a person of bad moral character, regardless of the nature of the crime or its serious discrimination within the private employment market, as many employers use the results from applicants' criminal background checks to deny them employment.
22
Furthermore, even after some formerly incarcerated people are able to find employment and are performing their jobs well, employers may still terminate those individuals once the employer discovers their criminal history.
23
Not surprisingly, studies show that even after five years of release from prison, almost 67% of all formerly incarcerated individuals remain unemployed or underemployed. 24 Other studies have shown that labor market discrimination is particularly pernicious for ex-offenders who are racial minorities, especially if they are black. 25 For example, the research of sociologists Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Naomi Sugie reveals not only that black job applicants with criminal records are less likely to obtain a job callback interview than white job applicants with criminal records, but also that black job applicants without a criminal record are less likely to receive a callback interview than white job applicants with a criminal record. 26 relevance to the intended occupation."). A number of real-life cases illustrate the hazards of state and municipal statutes that place barriers on the formerly incarcerated individual's ability to obtain professional licenses. See, e.g., Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 453 (1954) (holding that a doctor's state license to practice medicine could be suspended on the basis of a conviction without violating his due process rights because the state statute was "well within the degree of reasonableness required to constitute due process of law in a field so permeated with public responsibility as that of health"); Standow v. City of Spokane, 564 P.2d 1145, 1152-53 (Wash. 1977) (finding that the denial of a formerly incarcerated applicant's request for a license to operate a vehicle for hire based on a city ordinance that permitted the denial of such license on the basis of his prior convictions was valid on the grounds that the applicant's previous driving infractions and felony convictions were reasonably related to his ability to drive a motor vehicle for hire), overruled by State v. Smith, 610 P.2d 869 (Wash. 1980 
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The prospects for eliminating or even significantly reducing labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated are dim, both in the public and private realms. In the public realm, equal protection claims are unlikely to abrogate government statutes that prohibit the formerly incarcerated from obtaining the professional licenses required for certain jobs because any challenges to the use of a prisoner-nonprisoner classification in the statutes are likely to survive the low hurdle of rational basis review. 27 Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey forecloses any avenue for addressing this labor market discrimination against formerly incarcerated individuals who are racial minorities. 28 In McCleskey, the Court held that Georgia's application of the death penalty did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, despite its disparate effects based on the race of the defendant and the race of the victim. 29 Additionally, the Court held that proof of intent to discriminate is necessary if plaintiffs wish to prevail on race-based equal protection claims, which means that any formerly incarcerated plaintiffs who wish to prove that professional license-restricting statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause must prove unlawful intent by the respective legislatures in passing such statutes. 30 McCleskey, however, makes it clear that such formerly incarcerated plaintiffs would not be able to prove unlawful race discrimination in these cases because they could not show that the involved legislatures passed such statutes "in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of, ' [their] adverse effects upon" Blacks. 31 Furthermore, 27 See infra Part II. 28 (1988) . Also, we generally prefer to use the term "Blacks" to the term "African Americans" because "Blacks" is more inclusive. For example, while the term "Blacks" encompasses black permanent residents or other black noncitizens in the United States, the term "African Americans" includes only those who are formally Americans, whether by birth or naturalization. That said, given the historical nature of several parts of this Essay, and in light of the fact that a large influx of black immigrants did not occur in the United States until the 1960s and 1970s, we sometimes use the term "African American" where the term "Black" is not needed for inclusivity reasons. equal protection jurisprudence in general makes it clear that formerly incarcerated plaintiffs cannot establish that these license-restricting statutes are grounded in a racial classification. 32 Even though African-Americans and Latinos are overrepresented in prisons in the United States 33 -and thus disproportionately affected by such state statutes-they would not be able to show that the felon or ex-offender "classification" in these statutes constitutes a racial classification. 34 Indeed, courts would be certain to highlight that Whites are actually the numerical majority in the nation's prisons, even though they are underrepresented in comparison to their representation in the national population. 35 In the private realm, the formerly incarcerated would face equally formidable obstacles in proving unlawful discrimination. After all, there is no federal statute that prohibits employers from discriminating against the formerly incarcerated in hiring or promotion. 36 Although the "Ban the Box" movement is growing in the country, and a number of states have actually banned the boxes that ask about criminal history on applications, such actions reduce only the possibility that an employer will discriminate against the formerly incarcerated based on their former prisoner status; they do not make it unlawful for employers to actually discriminate against the formerly incarcerated on the basis of former prisoner status. 37 The only hope that formerly incarcerated plaintiffs have for combating discrimination in the private labor market comes from a nonbinding policy statement by the Equal ("The Court has defined 'discriminatory purpose' to mean, in race cases, out-and-out racial animus-an affirmative desire to hurt blacks."). 33 See GLENN C. LOURY, RACE, INCARCERATION AND AMERICAN VALUES 6 (2008) (comparing the United States' incarceration rate to that of other nations and detailing that the U.S. prison population is "vastly disproportionately black and brown"). 34 Cf. Sklansky, supra note 32, at 1304 (explaining that the race-based equal protection challenges to the crack-powder cocaine and essentially black-white disparity in sentencing repeatedly failed because "it is difficult if not impossible to prove, in part because hardly anyone admits to racism anymore, and in part because crack posed real dangers as well as symbolic ones, and much of what motivated Congress in 1986 appears to have been a well-founded fear of the drug's actual effects, on blacks as well as on whites"). 35 Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which advises that an employer's use of criminal background checks can violate the law if it is used to intentionally discriminate against minorities or has a demonstrably adverse discriminatory impact on minorities in employment. 38 In summary, litigation alone is unlikely to eliminate or even reduce labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated, including its disparate racial effects.
Keeping in mind that litigation is inadequate 39 for fully addressing the problem of labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated, this Essay explores and analyzes potential legislative and contractual means for removing the expansive barriers to labor market participation by exoffenders. First, as a means of addressing government-based discrimination, this Essay explores the potential effect that requiring racial impact statements-which mandate that legislators consider statistical analyses of the potential impact that legislation may have on racial and ethnic groups prior to passing any legislation-could have on employment discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. The Essay then moves on to consider a contractual solution that partially addresses discrimination by private firms, particularly those that rely on the labor of imprisoned individuals.
Part I of this Essay describes two different forms of labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated: (1) government-based discrimination in the form of laws that prohibit issuing professional licenses to the formerly incarcerated and (2) private discrimination in the form of corporate employers who use criminal records to deny or terminate employment. It also explores the negative effects on individuals and communities that arise from labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. Part II examines one potential solution to government-based discrimination against the formerly incarcerated in work law: requiring all legislative bodies to produce, examine, and consider racial impact statements before enacting any legislation that will affect the formerly incarcerated. In so doing, Part II analyzes the influence of racial impact statements in the few states that have implemented them. Part III then discusses contractual stipulation as another innovative solution for addressing discrimination by private corporations against the formerly incarcerated. Part III begins by examining the phenomenon of prison labor to demonstrate the appropriateness of this Essay's proposed contractual solution. Recognizing that many individuals actually provide low-wage (in fact, nearly free) labor 38 Id. for private corporations while they are in prison, this Part argues that the state penal institutions that lease prisoners to such corporations should push for contractual agreements that stipulate that corporations relying on prison labor must revoke any and all policies that bar employing the formerly incarcerated upon their release. In addition, Part III explicates how contractual stipulations may also provide for affirmative hiring policies for the formerly incarcerated. Finally, this Essay concludes by highlighting how failing to address continued labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated could render the formerly incarcerated a permanent economic underclass and undermine the most fundamental democratic notions of fairness and equality.
I. LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE FORMERLY INCARCERATED
The formerly incarcerated encounter numerous collateral consequences from their convictions, including loss of voting rights, restricted access to housing, and limited employment opportunities. 40 A collateral legal consequence of criminal conviction is defined as a legal "penalty, disability, or disadvantage, however denominated, imposed on an individual as a result of the individual's conviction of an offense [that] applies by operation of law whether or not the penalty, disability, or disadvantage is included in the judgment or sentence." 41 The collateral legal consequences of criminal convictions have also been referred to as "punishment that is accomplished through the diminution of the rights and privileges of citizenship and legal 40 42 Although the problems associated with the collateral consequences of conviction 43 are legion and touch upon every aspect of life, this Part focuses solely on the collateral consequences of conviction on employment, including exclusion from the labor market as a result of intersectional discrimination on the basis of race and criminal status. 44 Specifically, this Part details the forms of discrimination faced by the formerly incarcerated in the public and private labor market, as well as the consequences of such discrimination for the formerly incarcerated, their families, and society in general. Section I.A. begins by describing statesanctioned discrimination against the formerly incarcerated through restrictions or prohibitions in issuing professional licenses to former prisoners. Section I.B then details how private corporations discriminate against the formerly incarcerated. Finally, Section I.C explains why combating labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is critical by detailing the harms of such discrimination, not only for formerly incarcerated individuals, but also for their families and greater society.
A. Government Discrimination: Professional Licensing Laws
As scholars like Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Becky Pettit have long asserted, incarceration-or more accurately, the general stigma that attaches to incarceration-results in poor employment outcomes. 45 (discussing the legal implications of the author's audit study of employment prospects for formerly incarcerated men); Pager, supra note 25 (conducting an audit study by using male job applicants with criminal records and a control group and finding that those with criminal records were least likely to get callbacks and, further, that this effect was shaped by the race of the applicant, with black males with criminal records being the least likely to get a callback).
percent reduction in earnings and with reduced job tenure, reduced hourly wages, and higher unemployment."
46
One of the reasons why the formerly incarcerated suffer reduced employment opportunities in the labor market is legislation-at both the state and local government level-that either outright prohibits issuing them professional licenses or provides the grounds for licensing boards to unfairly rely on stereotypes and biases against ex-offenders to deny the formerly incarcerated professional licenses. Even in the 1970s, before the phenomenon of mass incarceration emerged, there were "1,948 separate statutory provisions that affect[ed] the licensing of persons with an arrest or conviction record." 47 Although a substantial number of states now have laws that prohibit licensing boards from denying the formerly incarcerated professional licenses based on past convictions that bear no relation to the work at issue, 48 many other states have maintained statutes that enable licensing boards to exclude the formerly incarcerated from work in certain fields simply because of a past felony conviction, even if that past conviction does not relate to the work at issue. 49 For instance, in South Dakota, nursing licensing boards may deny a license to any person with a felony conviction. 50 Indeed, as one scholar noted, "laws regulating public-employment hiring or licensing" bar ex-felons from obtaining licenses in at least 800 "discrete occupations." 51 More so, courts have consistently upheld the application of such license-restricting statutes to former prisoners. 52 For example, in Heller v. Ross, a federal district court upheld a licensing board's decision to deny the plaintiff an insurance provider license based on a provision excluding all persons with felony convictions from obtaining such a license. 53 In so doing, the court reasoned that the challenged provision survived constitutional 46 Western & Pettit, supra note 44, at 13. 47 [an] individual's having been previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses"; specifically, the exceptions might apply if (1) "there is a direct relationship between one or more of the previous criminal offenses and the specific license" or if (2) granting the license "would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public").
53 682 F. Supp. 2d at 807.
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scrutiny because "it applies only to would-be resident producers within the insurance industry; that is, it 'only restricts felons from receiving one type of license,'" rather than restricting them from all licenses.
54
In addition to blanket statutory exclusions from certain jobs, "moral character" provisions also provide a means for denying the formerly incarcerated certain professional licenses and excluding them from employment in those fields. 55 For instance, in Wombles v. City of Mount Washington, a federal district court upheld the denial of a business license to the plaintiff, noting that the challenged town ordinance "only restrict[ed] the granting of licenses based on . . . crimes of moral turpitude," even though the ordinance left the term "moral turpitude" undefined.
56

B. Private Employers: Reliance on Criminal Records in Hiring and Firing
In addition to labor market discrimination through license-restricting statutes, research shows that private employers often use criminal records as a reason for denying the formerly incarcerated employment or for terminating them thereafter.
57 Indeed, one audit study by Devah Pager revealed that having a criminal record alone drastically reduced the chance of receiving a callback from an employer.
58 Specifically, the study showed that, regardless of the race of the offenders, criminal records decreased a formerly incarcerated applicant's likelihood of getting a callback by at least 50%.
59
Pager's research further revealed that private labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is much more severe for Blacks than it is for Whites. 60 For instance, Pager found that "even whites with criminal records received more favorable treatment (17%) than blacks without criminal records (14%)" when both groups were considered for callback interviews.
61 While the ratio of callbacks for white job applicants without criminal records to white job applicants with criminal records was two-to-one-with 34% of whites without a criminal record obtaining callback interviews, compared with 17% of those with criminal records-the 54 comparable ratio for black job applicants was three-to-one, making the effect of a criminal record for Blacks 40% larger than it was for Whites. 62 Additionally, it is important to note that the detrimental impact of a criminal record attaches even when a defendant has been acquitted of charges. In fact, Cisco v. UPS illustrates this reality. In Cisco, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that, absent any applicable statute, criminal charges against an employee were sufficient grounds for termination (and a refusal to rehire), even when the employee had ultimately been acquitted of the charges. 63 The court reasoned that the employer had not violated any public policy because the "employer was protecting its reputation by discharging" the individual. 64 The court explained:
Thus, marriages crumble when one is adjudged guilty without ever being considered innocent and jobs are lost when the employer, for a legitimate business reason, cannot risk even someone under suspicion of having committed theft and trespass when the nature of its business is to enter onto the premises of others and to deliver parcels which belong to them.
65
In essence, even as the court recognized the illogic and injustice of these discriminatory practices by a private employer, plus their substantial impact on individuals, families, and communities, it still chose to affirm an employer's right to engage in these damaging actions.
C. The Importance of Addressing the Effects of Public and Private Labor Market Discrimination Against the Formerly Incarcerated
Developing new approaches for addressing labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is crucial because the consequences of this pervasive discrimination are severe, not only for formerly incarcerated individuals, but also for society more broadly. Recent studies examined the unemployment rate for formerly incarcerated adults and found that, of those interviewed one to three months after release, only 10% were employed fulltime, and only 44% of those interviewed eight months after release said they had worked at least one week since their release. 66 Although 60% of all exprisoners are rearrested within three years, ex-prisoners who have stable employment are much less likely to recidivate and more likely to reintegrate 62 Id. 63 476 A.2d 1340, 1344 (1984) . 64 Id. 
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into society than those without steady employment or with no employment at all. 67 After all, steady jobs make it more likely that an ex-prisoner will be able to financially support himself or his family. 68 Additionally, labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated negatively contributes to the national unemployment rate. 69 As Cherrie Bucknor and Alan Barber highlighted in a 2016 Center for Economic and Policy Research paper, formerly incarcerated men contribute 1.6 to 1.8 percentage points to the national male unemployment rate. 70 Additionally, overall employment rates are .09 to 1 percentage points lower as a result of the discrimination faced by the large population of former prisoners and people with felony convictions; this reduction in employment equals a reduction of nearly two million workers. 71 If one includes the currently incarcerated in these estimates, the impact is even greater, particularly for uneducated men of color. 72 For example, in 2008, data showed that approximately 60% of black men without a high school education were unemployed; however, when black male high school dropouts who were incarcerated were included, the percentage of unemployed men in that group increased to approximately 75%. 73 In other words, as Western and Pettit proclaimed, "by 2008 these men were more likely to be locked up than employed." 74 
Furthermore, as Western and Pettit highlighted in their National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth analysis, the inequities that stem from incarceration are intergenerational. They not only negatively affect the incarcerated and the formerly incarcerated, they also harm their families, 67 including their partners, children, grandchildren, and other descendants. 75 Finally, labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated harms society's sense of fairness. No studies support the idea that formerly incarcerated individuals are poor workers or pose a greater security risk than workers who have not been convicted of a crime. Instead, as the work of sociologist Devah Pager shows, the formerly incarcerated pose no higher level of risk than their coworkers without criminal records. 76 In a compelling case study, Jennifer Lundquist, Devah Pager, and Eiko Strader focused on the largest employer in the United States: the U.S. military. In the absence of a mandatory draft, the military relies on recruiting individuals (including those with felonies) to serve. 77 The authors found that, even in the military, which mandates even stricter rules for conduct than civilian workplaces, workers with felony-level criminal records are no more likely to be discharged for the negative reasons employers assume (such as misconduct or poor work performance) than those with no criminal record. 78 Furthermore, they found that there was no evidence that individuals with serious criminal records showed elevated levels of early termination-a key finding, since data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that "the risk of recidivism falls steadily with time since arrest, with nearly 60 percent of recidivism occurring within the first year."
79 All in all, Lundquist et al.'s research seems to indicate that there is no greater risk in employing the formerly incarcerated than the never incarcerated, and that the risk is particularly lower for formerly incarcerated individuals who have been out of prison for some time.
80
In all, reducing and ultimately eliminating labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is crucial because unemployment makes successful reentry much more difficult for them. Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that employment serves to reduce recidivism among the 75 Id. at 8; see also London, supra note 45, at 222-23 ("High incarceration rates in some areas, particularly low-income African American neighborhoods, have considerable consequences for families and communities. High recidivism rates further disrupt families, resulting in a dangerous pattern of imprisonment. Harsh sentencing policies and lack of reentry support 'harm children and contribute to the intergenerational transmission of offending.' Children face a host of challenges stemming from parental imprisonment." (footnotes omitted)). 76 Lundquist, Pager & Strader, supra note 67, at 1050. 77 Id. at 1040. 78 Id. at 1050. 79 Id. at 1041. 80 We understand that some might argue that the U.S. military, with its strict routines, protocols, and supervision, is too specialized an employer to be generalizable as a case study, and in that vein we urge private employers to allow the study of their formerly incarcerated employees for the benefit of societal edification.
1401
formerly incarcerated. 81 Addressing discrimination must also include addressing wages because levels of compensation also influence reentry outcomes, as those making higher wages are less likely to recidivate.
82
The next two Parts of this Essay offer a couple of suggestions for combating both public and private market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. Part II of this Essay proposes a means by which legislatures can help to reduce state-sanctioned discrimination against the formerly incarcerated in the workplace, and Part III turns to a potential contractual remedy for some of the discrimination that the formerly incarcerated face in the private labor market.
II. GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION: TURNING TO LEGISLATURES INSTEAD OF LITIGATION
As noted earlier, litigation, particularly equal protection litigation, is unlikely to be an effective means for combating state-sanctioned labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated through licenserestricting statutes for a variety of reasons. Those reasons include the low level of scrutiny-rational basis review-that would be applied to claims concerning a prisoner/non-prisoner classification and McCleskey's requirement that plaintiffs in race-based equal protection lawsuits prove a legislature's intent to pass the challenged statute "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon" a racial group. 83 In light of the limited impact that litigation is likely to have on reducing state-sanctioned discrimination against the formerly incarcerated in the workplace, this Part proposes a means by which state legislatures can help to lessen the impact of this discrimination-in this instance, the discrimination that occurs through state statutes that prohibit licensing entities from granting certain professional licenses to the formerly incarcerated. Specifically, this Part of the Essay proposes that all legislative bodies should adopt a requirement for 81 "racial impact statements," which force legislators to engage in a statistical analysis about the disproportionate impact that any proposed legislation may have on racial and ethnic minorities before they pass the proposed legislation.
84
The call for racial impact statements arose from a recognition of the devastating impact that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which provided mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes, and other "War on Drugs" policies were having on communities of color, especially the black community.
85 That recognition involved not only an acknowledgment of mass incarceration as a pernicious social problem in the United States, 86 but also an understanding of mass incarceration as a social issue that has uniquely plagued black and brown communities. As a result, racial impact statement requirements were designed to force lawmakers to consider the inequalities and complexities related to the overrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities in U.S. prisons when they adopted or amended any legislation. 88 In this way, legislators would be pushed to consider the negative consequences that their proposed statutes and policies might have on people of color within the criminal justice system and in relation to the criminal justice system and, more so, would be pushed to "consider alternative approaches that without creating additional disparity in Minnesota's criminal justice system. . . . [T]he agency does not intend to comment on whether or not a particular bill should be enacted. Rather, it is setting out facts that may be useful to the Legislature, whose members frequently express concerns about the disparity between the number of minorities in our population and the number in our prisons.
90
At the very least, racial impact statement requirements were expected to push legislators to justify any enacted laws or policies that worked to create, maintain, or increase racial and ethnic disparities by forcing the legislators to explain why they had chosen to pass the statutes despite their projected racially disparate effects. In this sense, racial impact statement requirements have the potential to provide a means by which plaintiffs can prove that any statute challenged in equal protection litigation was enacted "in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon" a racial group. 91 Several states have passed legislation that requires the consideration of racial impact statements in their legislative processes. 92 Indeed, Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oregon have each passed racial impact legislation, and many other states, including Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Texas, and Wisconsin, have considered passing racial impact statement legislation. 93 For instance, since 2008, Iowa has mandated, through the Minority Impact Statement Bill, that its state legislative services agency not only prepare a correctional impact statement for proposed policy changes related to the criminal justice system, but also conduct a racial impact analysis that examines the impact of sentencing or parole changes on racial and ethnic minorities. 94 Iowa enacted these requirements in response to a 90 See London, supra note 45, at 228 (emphasis added) (citing MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1405 study indicating that Iowa's prisons had the highest racial disparities in the nation with almost fourteen black prisoners for every one white prisoner.
95 Indeed, Chet Culver, then Iowa's governor, stated that the requirement would allow members of the General Assembly and executive branch to consider legislation with a "better understanding of the potential effects, both positive and negative, on Iowa's minority communities." 96 Since then, Iowa's Minority Impact Statement Bill has resulted in ten minority impact statements; these statements have shown great promise for setting a context in which racial disparities can be reduced in Iowa's criminal justice system. 97 For example, in one instance, Iowa lawmakers declined passing legislation after a racial impact statement revealed that the proposed statute "would increase penalties for cocaine offenses after a racial-impact statement showed the policy would disproportionately affect blacks."
98
Much like Iowa, Oregon adopted a racial impact statement requirement in 2013 because of racial disproportionality in its prison system and its child welfare system. 99 Though not as stark as the disparities in Iowa, statistics in Oregon also exposed an overrepresentation of Blacks in its criminal justice system, with Blacks making up only 2% of the state population but 9% of the Oregon prison population. 100 Similarly, a letter from Democratic State Representative Joseph Gallegos, the sponsor of Oregon's racial impact statement bill, detailed racial disparities within Oregon's child welfare system, with both black and American Indian children each making up nearly 9% of the children in the child welfare system despite each comprising less than 2% of all children in Oregon. 101 Oregon's racial impact statement legislation requires the state sentencing commission or a legislative analyst to produce a statistical report if one member of each party requests such a 95 Because Blacks and Latinos are overrepresented in the prison population in essentially every state in the United States, and because racial impact statement requirements in each state would require legislators to explicitly confront and interrogate the racial implications of professional license-restricting statutes before they were either created or amended, racial impact statements, which are "modeled on fiscal and environmental impact statements,"
105 have a very strong potential for helping to reduce labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated across the nation. They have the potential for doing so because they help to strip legislators of any claims of ignorance or lack of knowledge about the potentially dangerous outcomes of any enacted legislation on communities of color. More importantly, racial impact statement requirements may make social science knowledge of racially disparate effects-knowledge that the McCleskey Court found insufficient to prove intent to discriminate-a potential consideration for legislative bodies and, ultimately, courts in any future equal protection litigation.
III. A CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION TO PRIVATE EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE FORMERLY INCARCERATED
Although racial impact statement requirements have the potential for effectively combating the harmful effects of professional license-restricting statutes on the formerly incarcerated, additional action is needed to address private labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. The use of low-paid prison labor by private corporations remains a widespread practice that calls into question the policies of those same corporations that prohibit employing the formerly incarcerated. In this Part, the Essay traces the rise of prison labor as a relic of slavery, and makes the argument that, to finally jettison prison labor practices as a particular remnant of racial slavery in the United States, prison labor cannot exist alongside private firm policies that compound the exclusion of the formerly incarcerated from the labor market.
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While the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution has been lauded by history books and legal scholars for abolishing slavery, the Amendment has also been read to uphold labor practices that in reality could amount to slavery for a certain segment of the American population-that is, those convicted of a crime. 106 The Thirteenth Amendment reads: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. The legal rationale behind this assertion is that constitutional protections against unfair labor practices are "denied to prisoners compelled to work [as part of their penal punishment] because the beneficial value of the prisoners' labor was owned by the prison; i.e., they were enslaved by the state."
112 As Raghunath further explicated, even if a "plain reading of the Thirteenth Amendment would allow for the imposition of either involuntary servitude or slavery as punishment for crime," societal changes may indicate a different direction; given changing attitudes towards punishment and the fact that "we no longer view the infliction of pain-or rather, too much pain-as an acceptable form of punishment . . . presumably sentencing convicted criminals to slave-like conditions (or granting prison wardens the discretion to treat them as such) is not an acceptable policy option."
113
Although there might seem to be a general consensus against the imposition of slave-like labor conditions as a form of punishment in theory, in practice, low-paid or unpaid prison labor has been a longstanding feature of prison life in the United States. The extraction of the labor of prisoners in the United States can be traced back to the first prisons built by European colonialists in the 1600s. 114 The first carceral systems in colonial America depended on prison labor for financial support. 115 The pecuniary costs of maintaining the penal system were directly transferred to the prisoners. 116 The prison administration accomplished this by renting out the labor of prisoners to private enterprises or by compelling inmates to produce goods for sale. 117 In this way, inmates were obliged "to pay for the expenses of staying in the prison, including all transactions between entry and discharge." 118 While many would argue that the original goal of prison labor in the United States was to promote an ascetic ideal of self-abnegation and 112 Id. at 399 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 113 Id. at 405 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 114 See DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 19-26 discipline, 119 prison labor has taken on a more profit-driven capitalist tenor since the nineteenth century. 120 In what has been described as "the golden age" of the American penitentiary 121 following the American Civil War, the rise of public prisons run by private contractors foretold the expansion of prison labor. 122 The Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century was a major factor 123 that drove the expansion of prison labor under the "lease" system, 124 as states started to "lease" inmates to private companies as cheap labor. 125 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the lease system was most prevalent in the Southern states after the Civil War and the end of slavery. 126 Pursuant to the lease system, inmates worked for little or no pay on plantations, railroads, mines, and other business ventures that required inexpensive, unskilled labor, 127 with the goal of producing the maximum financial profit for the entrepreneurs who leased the labor. 128 convicts to abusive conditions. 129 Second, prison labor faced attacks from labor unions because it had dampened the wages of all workers. 130 Yet, prison labor is once again flourishing today because such labor is viewed as the solution to the problems linked to the cost of incarceration. 131 One of the most visible proponents of prison labor, Chief Justice Warren Burger argued:
Most prison inmates, by definition, are maladjusted people . . . . They do not share the work ethic concepts that made this country great. They were not taught at home-or in the schools-the moral values that lead people to have respect and concern for the rights of others. Place that person in a factory, . . . pay that person reasonable compensation, and charge something for "room and board and keep," and we will have a better chance to release from prison a person able to secure gainful employment. Added to that it will be a person whose selfesteem will at least have been improved so there is a better chance that he or she can live a normal life. 132 The use of prison labor, while not universally embraced, still enjoys considerable support today, 133 particularly since it is seen as an efficient method for inmates to learn job skills and gain some income, all while contributing to their own upkeep. 134 Approximately 50% of the inmates housed in state or federal prisons work in some type of job assignment while 1411 incarcerated. 135 As noted by Noah Zatz, "prison industries generate $2 billion in revenue annually."
136 Momentarily setting aside the legal and ethical implications of prison labor, 137 the fact that corporations successfully benefit from the labor of imprisoned individuals raises the question of whether or not those same corporations should then be allowed to dismiss formerly incarcerated job applicants. For illustrative purposes, Table 1 138 below lists some prominent American-based companies with large employee bases that use prison labor and that also generally do not hire formerly incarcerated individuals. 135 If prison labor is deemed an appropriate vehicle to enable prisoners to gain job skills, why then should companies, who ostensibly have benefited from those same job skills while a formerly incarcerated individual was behind bars, also have the power to reject the same individual when she presents herself in the private labor market? If prison labor is to serve any form of rehabilitative goal, then it stands to reason that formerly incarcerated individuals who have taken it upon themselves (or been compelled) to gain skills valuable in the labor market should have the equal opportunity to exercise those skills. 139 Most of the data we could find on employment of the formerly incarcerated came from online search forums because policies against hiring the formerly incarcerated are not always publicized on company websites. The data for the companies listed can be found either at https://helpforfelons.org/companies-that-hire-felons In fact, one potential solution to private labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated might be recognizing the low-paid work that many of the incarcerated do on behalf of corporations. The state penal institutions that lease prisoners to such corporations could push for a contractual agreement which stipulates that corporations will abrogate policies that bar the formerly incarcerated from employment and that seek to inquire about criminal records, as those policies could have a chilling effect on formerly incarcerated job applicants.
This genre of contractual obligations finds legal precedent in the obligations that the government enforces on its private contractors, who must abide by higher standards of workplace diversity and ethics. 140 When it comes to removing the barriers to employment for the formerly incarcerated, some focus must be on dissuading private firms from discriminating against the formerly incarcerated. Note, for example, that the EEOC advised in a recent policy statement that using criminal background checks for employment purposes would violate the law if the checks are used to intentionally discriminate against minorities or if they have a demonstrably adverse discriminatory impact on minorities.
141 Consequently, employers are advised against using blanket criminal record checks in their hiring decisions; the checks should instead relate to "business necessity."
142 This focus on preventing private firms from discriminating against the formerly incarcerated has led to "Ban the Box" (BTB) movements in several states and cities, and as a result of such efforts, many cities have adopted policies that make it illegal for employers to include questions soliciting information about an applicant's criminal record at the initial application stage. The threshold amounts for these laws typically begin at the $10,000-contract level, and compliance requirements increase as the amount of the contract and the size of the contractor's workforce increase. An affirmative action program is a management tool designed to ensure equal opportunity in recruiting, hiring, training, promoting, and compensating individuals. Affirmative action goes beyond equal employment opportunity measures, requiring employers to eliminate discriminatory conditions, whether inadvertent or intentional, and to treat all employees equally in the workplace. However, the efficacy of BTB policies is yet unproven, and some preliminary studies may even indicate that they have undesirable effects. 144 For example, a Yale Law School study on the BTB movement and its effects on employment discrimination found that employers who ask about criminal records are 63% more likely to call back an applicant if he has no criminal record. 145 Additionally, the study showed that BTB policies-where employers refrain from asking about criminal records at least until a conditional offer of employment is made-encouraged statistical discrimination on the basis of race. 146 Specifically, the study showed that, before BTB, white job applicants to employers who asked about criminal records "received 7% more callbacks than similar black applicants, but after BTB [that] gap grew to 45%."
147 These potential effects of the BTB policy point to another contractual solution for remedying private firm discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. Contracts between state or federal prisons and private corporations could mirror the diversity initiative imposed on federal contractors. In this way, private firms that make use of prison labor could be contractually required to employ at least some percentage of formerly incarcerated individuals. 148 As discussed above, employment is crucial to reentry, regardless of whether or not the formerly incarcerated are seen as a special class. Thus, we must still consider carefully whether excluding the formerly incarcerated from gainful employment-without any scientific evidence supporting the benefits of such exclusions-serves the larger societal goal of reintegration after incarceration.
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CONCLUSION
In Greek Mythology, Prometheus disobeys Zeus and steals fire for humans. 149 As punishment, Prometheus is chained to a rock in the Caucasus Mountains where, eternally, his liver is eaten daily by an eagle only to regenerate and be eaten again. 150 To our modern sensibilities, this type of perpetual punishment (in fiction) is exceedingly harsh. Yet, in the real world, our society has routinely condoned the collateral consequences of conviction, including labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated, which effectively punish, in perpetuity, the formerly incarcerated for the crimes that they have already paid a debt for. In so doing, our society has only undermined efforts to reintegrate the formerly incarcerated. Furthermore, given the significant numbers of racial minorities who have been incarcerated (some wrongfully), continued punishment in the form of collateral consequences seems not only particularly punitive, but also racially discriminatory. Indeed, the rejection of the formerly incarcerated by corporations that rely on prison labor appears hypocritical and without rational basis. Most of all, we should question whether a lack of equal opportunity for the formerly incarcerated on the labor market means their permanent designation as an economic underclass and whether this ultimately betrays the principles of fairness and equality foundational to American democracy. 
